In this paper, we propose a two-country monetary union DSGE model with housing, in order to study how di¤erent shocks contributed to the increase in housing prices and credit in the EMU prior to the crisis. One of the countries is calibrated to represent the core group in the Euro area while the other one corresponds to the periphery. First, we explore how a liquidity shock (or a decrease in the interest rate) a¤ects house prices and the real economy through the asset price and the collateral channel. Then, we analyze how a house price shock in the periphery and a technology shock in the core countries are transmitted to the both economies. We …nd that a combination of an increase in liquidity in the Euro area coming from the common monetary policy, together with asymmetric house price and technology shocks, can explain the increase in house prices in the Euro area and the stronger credit growth in the peripheral economies in the pre-crisis period.
Introduction
The launch of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 built up large imbalances in housing markets between European countries. In particular, we can distinguish two groups of countries: the peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, known as GIIPS) and the rest. 1 One of these imbalances was set in the real sector when residential property prices of new and existing houses and ‡ats increased 80% in the periphery from 1999 to 2007, while in the core the increase was less than 20%. Moreover, real gross …xed capital formation in dwellings doubled in the periphery and stated the same in the core between both years. Additionally, mortgage loans grew moderately in the core but they boomed in the periphery (Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa and Makarski, 2014).
Several scholars have pointed the possibility that the main drivers of the asymmetric evolution of the housing prices between the two areas could be of di¤erent nature. The …rst driver may remain in the …nancial sector: a fall in interest rates following their euro area accession and the easy access to cross-border borrowing after the launch EMU (see for instance ECB, 2003; Honohan and Leddin 2006; Blanchard, 2007; or Andrés et al., 2013) . Secondly, it could be possible that a house price bubble was developed in the periphery. Finally, a third possibility might be in the real economy: shocks to productivity with asymmetric distribution between core and periphery (Andrés et al., 2013) .
With respect to the …rst driver, it is important to note that in the Euro area, monetary policy is common for all the countries and it is conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB implemented, since the introduction of the Euro till 2006, an expansionary monetary policy which increased liquidity in the Euro area (See Figure A1 in the Appendix). This fact was re ‡ected in decreasing the interest rate to unprecedented lows. The fall was even more dramatic if the pre-EMU interest rates are taken into account. 2 Furthermore, due to the signi…cant di¤erences between the core and periphery 1 See Quint and Rabanal (2014) for more details on this division. 2 For instance, the average Spanish government interest rate (interest payments/sovereign debt stock) fell from around 9% in the late 1990s to below 4% by 2010. economies, the common monetary policy could have an asymmetric impact. The domestic demand growth was extremely strong at the periphery but very weak at the core. Therefore, monetary policy was too loose for the periphery and too tight for the rest. The increase in liquidity, the reduction of the interest rate, and its asymmetric impact caused di¤erent e¤ects on the housing prices and credit in the core and the periphery through the transmission channels of monetary policy.
Secondly, many of the peripheral countries experimented strong increases in housing demand, not determined by economic fundamentals, which can be interpreted as housing bubbles or asymmetric house price shocks.
The third driver, an asymmetric productivity shock, could also a¤ect di¤erently the house prices of the core and the periphery. The productivity in the core evolved better than in the periphery. 3 Even though the peripheral productivity was not improving as much as in the core, those countries bene…tted from the lower common interest rates stemming from low in ‡ation in the more productive region. This created a demand shock that a¤ected credit and house prices in the periphery.
In order to explore the three previous drivers, we develop a model with two countries inside a monetary union. We identify these countries as core and periphery, respectively. In each country, there are two sectors, construction and consumption, and two in…nite-horizon households, savers and borrowers. The model constitutes a two-country version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005) , that introduces a …nancial accelerator that works through the housing sector. This is done in the spirit of Iacoviello and Smets (2006) and Aspachs and Rabanal (2010) . However, it introduces cross-country housing-market heterogeneity as in Rubio (2014) . The model is then adapted to represent the core and the periphery in the Euro area, as in Brzoza-Brzezina et al (2014) and Quint and Rabanal (2014) , who, di¤erently to us, use their framework to study how to implement macroprudential policies in these two regions. In our paper, we use this model to analyze the in ‡uence of interest rate falls (increase in liquidity), and productivity shocks, on the asymmetric evolution of housing prices in the core and the periphery. Additionally, we study the impact of a shock in house prices that some scholars, such as in't Results from our simulations show that the increase in liquidity can explain higher house prices, through an asset price channel. Furthermore, collateral e¤ects coming from higher house prices, contributed to the credit boom in the Euro area, being the e¤ects more remarkable in the periphery, given that these countries were more leveraged. We also consider a house price shock in the periphery, to 3 See Figure A2 in the Appendix. account for a housing bubble in this area. We see that a stronger housing demand preference in these economies increases credit by a large amount, through the collateral constraint of borrowers. Finally, we observe that higher productivity in the core makes the common interest rate decrease and this causes a demand shock in the periphery, making credit and house prices increase through the credit channel.
Summarizing, our analysis shows that the combination of an increase in liquidity in the Euro area coming from the common monetary policy, together with asymmetric house price and technology shocks, contributed to the increase in house prices in the Euro area and the stronger credit growth in the peripheral economies in the pre-crisis period.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents some discussion on the related literature and the contribution of the paper. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 simulates the model. Section 4 concludes.
Related Literature and Contribution
There are a number of empirical studies that study the interrelations between monetary policy, liquidity and other shocks with house prices and credit. On the other hand, there is also plenty of evidence that housing and credit markets did not behave in the same way across European countries. Guerrieri and Esposito (2012) provide evidence of these imbalances. They notice that the demand boom in the peripheral countries, led to losses of competitiveness and asset price in ‡ation, notably in the housing market. Hansen (2010) and Marin (2010) suggest that Germany and the core countries reduced their labour costs, following the launch of the Euro and increased their productivity. Furthermore, as Stockhammer (2011) shows the core economies were export-led while the peripheral were credit-led. In the periphery, credit-…nanced consumption growth and residential investment became the key source of demand growth and run substantial current account de…cits. Besides, the core did not experience an equally strong rise in household debt and consumption and increasingly relied on exports as the main growth engine. Also, as pointed out by Quint and Rabanal (2014) , the leverage in the housing sector was much higher in the periphery than in the core countries.
The increase in household debt in percentage of GDP from 2000 to 2008 was more than 32% in Spain, 61% in Ireland, 21% in Portugal and 18% in Italy; while in core countries was much lower, in Austria was 7% and in Germany 11%. 4 Our paper also sheds some light, from a theoretical perspective, on the e¤ects of these imbalances.
We calibrate the model to be representative of the core and the peripheral group and characterize asymmetric house price shocks (in the periphery) and asymmetric productivity shocks (in the core), to account for this evidence and …nd the mechanisms that explain them. We approximate the more leveraged countries by a higher LTV, which makes the collateral constraint more important and the …nancial accelerator e¤ects stronger. In this way, the model is able to capture this di¤erence between the two areas. Furthermore, since it is a two country model within a monetary union, the analysis is also able to illustrate the asymmetric technology and house price shocks between these two regions and the common monetary policy. Therefore, the structure of the model is suitable to answer the research question that we propose.
We introduce several channels in the setting through which shocks are transmitted. Throughout the paper, we consider liquidity shocks and changes in the interest rate as equivalent. As Woodford (2003) and Michis (2014) show, interest rates are in ‡uenced mainly by the money supply (i.e., the liquidity e¤ect). Then, a change in the interest rate or in the liquidity can a¤ect real estate prices via di¤erent channels. The …rst channel is the credit channel (Mishkin, 2007) . Lower interest rates make it cheaper to obtain a mortgage and thus, there is an increase in the housing demand and an increase in the housing prices. This channel is present in our model through borrower's debt repayments. The second channel is the so-called asset in ‡ation channel (Belke et al, 2008) . In this case, lower interest rates imply higher asset prices, including housing prices. In our model, housing prices move inversely with interest rates. Another channel that we explore here is the impact of house prices in the economy. Our model captures the positive wealth e¤ect in case that the real estate price increases, since borrowers use houses as collateral to obtain loans. A higher price will let them increase their purchases, including houses. Therefore, in our paper, we analyze the in ‡uence of interest rate falls (increase in liquidity), and productivity shocks, on the asymmetric evolution of housing prices in the core and the periphery. Additionally, we also study the impact of a shock in house prices. 4 See Stockhammer (2011) 5 We consider an in…nite-horizon, two-country, two-sector economy inside a monetary union. The home country (Core) is denoted by COR and the rest of the union (the periphery) by PER. Households consume, work, and demand real estate. Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. We assume that labor is immobile across the countries. Firms follow a standard Calvo problem. In this economy, both …nal and intermediate goods are produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate-goods
sector. There is a construction sector that produces houses. We introduce transaction-facilitating money by the device of including real balances as an argument of each household's utility function. Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank that responds to a weighted average of in ‡ation in both countries. We allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
The Consumer' s Problem
There are two types of consumers in each country: borrowers and savers. Borrowers are constrained individuals who need to collateralize their debt repayment, that is, interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expected future value of the current house stock. As in Iacoviello (2005), I assume that constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. 5 
Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in COR maximize as follows:
Here, E 0 is the expectation operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and C t , H t , m t ; and L t are consumption at t, the stock of housing, real money balances and hours worked, respectively. 6 j represents the weight of housing in the utility function. 1= ( 1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, de…ned as:
where n is the size of COR. Unconstrained consumers provide labor to both the consumption and con-
5 This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and that the economy is endogenously split into borrowers and savers. 6 It is assumed that housing services are proportional to the housing stock.
The budget constraint for COR is as follows:
where P CORt and P P ERt are the prices of the goods produced in Countries COR and PER, respectively, Q CORt is the housing price in COR, and W ct and W ht are the consumption and housing sector wages for unconstrained consumers. B t represents domestic bonds denominated in the common currency. R CORt is the nominal interest rate in COR. Positive bond holdings signify borrowing, and negative signify savings.
However, as we will see, unconstrained consumers will choose not to borrow at all: they are the savers in this economy. D t are foreign-bond holdings by savers in COR. 7 M t are nominal money balances. R t is the nominal rate of foreign bonds, which are denominated in euros. As is common in the literature, to ensure stationarity of net foreign assets we introduced a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero foreign borrowing, 2 D 2 t . 8 Savers obtain interest on their savings. F t are lump-sum pro…ts received from the …rms. T t are lump-sum government transfers.
Dividing by P CORt , we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods in COR:
where CORt denotes in ‡ation for the goods produced in COR, de…ned as P CORt =P CORt 1 : q CORt is de…ned as Q CORt =P CORt :
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the …rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
7 Savers have access to international …nancial markets. 8 See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) for a similar speci…cation of the budget constraint.
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price, and it re ‡ects the fact that countries are trading. Equation (5) is the Euler equation for consumption, which states that consumers would like to smooth consumption over time. That is, at the margin, consumers should be indi¤erent between consuming one extra unit of consumption today or saving it to the future. Equation (6) is the …rst-order condition for net foreign assets, and its intuition is equivalent to the previous Euler equation. Equation (7) represents money demand, that is an Euler equation for money. 9 Equations (8) and (9) are the labor-supply conditions for both sectors. These equations are standard. Equation (10) is the Euler equation for housing and states that, at the margin, the bene…ts from consuming housing today have to be equal to the costs. That is, if consumers consume one unit of housing today, they enjoy the utility it derives and they can sell it in the future. However, they incur in a cost today in terms of consumption.
Combining (5) and (6) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds: 10
9 The Euler condition for money is a typical expression for the price of an asset. If consumers give up consumption today and decide to hold money forever from then on, they will enjoy the stream of utility services which will be eroded from the rise in prices.
1 0 The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume in this paper that the law of one price holds:
where variables with a star denote foreign variables.
Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e < . Constrained consumers face a collateral constraint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation of tomorrow's value of today's stock of housing:
where equation (13) represents the collateral constraint for the borrower. k COR can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in COR.
Borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
where
; subject to the budget constraint (in terms of the consumption good in COR):
and subject to the collateral constraint (13).
The …rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
These …rst-order conditions can be interpreted in a similar way to the ones of the savers. However, they di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals in some aspects. In the case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint ( t ) appears in equations (17) and (21) to re ‡ect the fact that housing has an extra collateral e¤ect on these consumers. As in Iacoviello (2005) , the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero. 11 The problem for consumers is analogous in PER.
Firms 2.2.1 Final-Consumption Goods Producers
In COR, there is a continuum of …nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function:
1 1 From the Euler equations for consumption of the unconstrained consumers, we know that RCOR = 1= , where variables without a time subscript denote steady-state variables. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for consumption for the constrained individual, we have = n e =C 0 COR > 0. Given that > e , the borrowing constraint holds with equality in steady state. Since the model is log-linearized around the steady state and low uncertainty is assumed, this result can be generalized to o¤-steady-state dynamics.
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by
Y CORt (z) = P COR (z) P CORt " Y CORt ; and the price index is P CORt = h R 1 0 P CORt (z) 1 " dz i 1 " 1 :
Intermediate-Goods and House Producers
The 
;
where t represents technology. We assume that log t = log t 1 + u t , where is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and u t is a normally distributed shock to technology. 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor.
Symmetry across …rms allows avoiding index z and re-writing equation (23) as:
The production function for housing investment is as follows:
Producers maximize pro…ts:
The …rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price P CORt (z) ; and 1 is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P OP T CORt (z) solves the following:
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
Using (31) and (32) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve. 12 The …rm problem is similar in PER.
Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Economy-wide aggregates in Country COR are
The market clearing condition for the …nal good in Country COR is nY CORt = nC CORt +(1 n) C CORt + n 2 d 2 t . Domestic …nancial markets clear:
The world bond market clearing condition is nd t + (1 n)
where d t denotes the foreign bonds in real terms. The net foreign asset
Everything is similar in PER.
Monetary Policy
In order to close the model, we need to specify a way to introduce monetary policy. The central bank uses the money supply as an instrument to a¤ect the economy, so that injecting or draining liquidity into the system is transmitted through credit and housing markets until it a¤ects real variables. However, if
we combine the saver's Euler equation for consumption (equation 5) with their money demand (equation 7), we observe the following:
That is, for given values of consumption and prices and taking into account equation (11) , there is a one-to-one mapping between the money supply and the interest rate set by the central bank. Therefore, monetary policy can be represented by an interest rate rule. In this way, a decrease in the target interest rate is equivalent to an increase in liquidity and vice versa. With this approach, although there would be a transaction-oriented demand for real money balances implied by the optimization problem of the agents, when policy is based on an interest rate policy rule, the money demand function would serve only to indicate the quantity of money needed to support the interest rate rule. Thus, throughout the paper we will assume that interest rate shocks are analogous to liquidity shocks. 13 
Interest Rate Rule
We consider a Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single central bank, 14
0 R 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia.
(1 + ) measures the sensitivity of interest rates to current in ‡ation. " R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2 "R .
This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability.
Dynamics
In this section, we simulate the model to illustrate how monetary policy a¤ects housing prices and the rest of economic variables in the core and the periphery. In particular, we want to explore how an increase in liquidity has a¤ected housing markets and the real economy in both economies. We also illustrate the e¤ects of house price shocks and technology shocks in the periphery and the core economies, respectively.
Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to re ‡ect the core economy and the periphery. Some of the parameters are standard and are common for both economies and some others will be speci…cally calibrated for each area. 15 Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state. The discount factor for borrowers, e , is set to 0:98. 16 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0:12. This parameter pins down the ratio of housing wealth to GDP. 17 We set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1: 18 Following Horvath (2000) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we set the inverse elasticity of substitution across hours in the two sectors to one: For the loan-to-value ratio we consider a steady-state value of 0.70 and 0.80, for COR and PER, respectively, in order to re ‡ect a low and a high leveraged country. 19 The labor-income share of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7. 20 We pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. For the Taylor Rule parameters, we use = 0:8, = 0:5: The …rst value re ‡ects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing. 21 is consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993: The size of the peripheral group is considered to be 40%. 22 A technology shock is a 1% positive technology with 0.9 persistence. 23 the ECB decreased the interest rate from 4.75% to 2%, as it is shown in Figure A1 . In this section, we proxy this ECB policy as a negative interest-rate shock.
As expected, in Figure 1 , we observe that an increase in liquidity has an immediate e¤ect in house prices. As stated before, there are several channels that can potentially link liquidity with house prices.
Through the asset-price channel, since the increase in liquidity lowers the interest rate, asset prices should increase due to a substitution e¤ect from money to other assets. House prices are an asset price and therefore they should move inversely with the interest rate. Figure 1 shows that this is precisely what happens; following the decrease in the interest rate, house prices start to rise. We also see that loose credit conditions in the Euro area lead to an increase in borrowing, especially in the periphery.
There are two reasons why this occurs. First, lower interest rates make it cheaper to obtain a mortgage and thus, the common lower interest rates makes credit increase in both the core and the periphery.
A second reason which represents a strong mechanism in this model is wealth e¤ects. Borrowers need housing collateral in order to obtain loans. The value of this collateral is thus linked to house prices since houses will be more or less valuable depending on house price movements. As we have seen, the increase in liquidity makes house prices go up and therefore the value of the collateral to increase as well. This produces a wealth e¤ect because borrowers are wealthier now, since they can obtain more credit either to purchase more houses or more consumption goods. This collateral channel is the so-called …nancial accelerator e¤ect since changes due to non-…nancial reasons, such as liquidity in this case, are ampli…ed through the …nancial market. We also see that the fact that the LTV is higher in the periphery makes these households be more sensitive to changes in the interest rate, due to a stronger …nancial accelerator e¤ect. The increase in liquidity causes a common demand shock in both areas but it exacerbates the credit boom in the periphery. Mortgaged houses, although they increase in both areas, increase by more in the peripheral economies. This increase in housing demand should also have an e¤ect on house prices.
However, as we see in the graph, house prices do not increase by more in the periphery than in the core countries. Thus, given that the increase in house prices is very similar in the two economies, we can conclude that the channel that is prevalent here is the asset price channel, which is common for both the core and the periphery. In terms of consumption, demand increases in both groups of countries due to lower interest rates and the collateral e¤ects, but by more in the periphery.
House price shock in PER
In order to explain the higher house price growth in the peripheral economies, we assume that the periphery su¤ered a housing demand shock that was translated to higher house prices. Brzoza-Brzezina There is a general consensus about the fact that some periphery countries su¤ered a bubble on house prices during the …rst years of the 21st century. 24 Therefore, in order to explain the higher house price growth in the peripheral economies, we …rst analyze the situation in which the periphery su¤ers a housing demand shock that is translated to higher house prices. In the next section we will consider a technology shock. Figure 2 illustrates an increase in the preference for houses in the periphery produces a raise in housing prices in this area. Since the value of the collateral is higher in the peripheral economies but not in the core countries, borrowing increases only in the periphery, creating a credit boom in this region.
Houses, in the periphery, since they serve as a collateral, have an intrinsic value that consumption goods do not have. Therefore, in the periphery, households substitute away consumption goods by mortgaged
houses. This is why we observe a strong increase in mortgaged houses, …nanced by the increase in credit and a slight decrease in consumption. The common interest rate slightly falls in the monetary Here, we see that higher house prices also a¤ects the interest rate and thus liquidity. The e¤ect is bidirectional. If we compare this shock with the previous one, we see that in order to explain the di¤erent behavior of house prices in the core and the periphery that we empirically observed, we cannot only rely on liquidity shocks. The liquidity shock produces an upward e¤ect in house prices that is mainly driven by the asset-price channel and therefore, given the common monetary policy in the Euro area, it does not generate a di¤erent behavior in house prices across economies. We need to introduce asymmetric house price (housing demand) shocks in order to explain the higher hike in house prices in this periphery, as compared to the core.
Technology shock in COR
As it was pointed out before, technology shocks were one of the main drivers of ‡uctuations in house prices and residential investment in EMU countries. However, they did not occur evenly between the core and the peripheral countries. In Figure A2 in the Appendix, we show the growth in multifactor productivity for the core and the periphery. We observe that the growth in productivity was higher in the pre-crisis period in the core region than in the periphery. For instance, the di¤erence in productivity growth between the two areas was 0.2 percentage points in 2001 and it increased up to 1.4 percentage points in 2006. Then, productivity di¤erentials between the core and the periphery after the launch of the Euro may have contributed to the credit boom in the peripheral economies previous to the crisis.
In Figure 3 , we illustrate an asymmetric shock that happens only in the core countries, to proxy for this evidence. The core countries experiment a productivity shock that increases output and decreases in ‡ation. Lower in ‡ation rates in the core countries, which have a higher weight in the Taylor rule, make the systematic component of the policy rule respond by lowering interest rates. The decrease in the interest rate, in the context of the monetary union, is common to the periphery as well. The periphery does not bene…t from a productivity shock but it is transmitted to these countries in the form of lower interest rates, loosening credit conditions. Thus, a supply shock in the core Euro area becomes a demand shock in the periphery, due to lower interest rates. Therefore, consumption in the periphery also increases, as in the core but at the expense of higher in ‡ation and a credit boom that is stronger than in the core countries.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we build a two-country, two-sector DSGE model with housing and collateral constraints in order to illustrate how the common monetary policy and asymmetric shocks to technology and housing preferences contributed to the increase in house prices and credit in the Euro area previous to the crisis.
We characterize the two economies as the core and the periphery, in order to compare the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks among these di¤erent groups of countries.
Using this framework, we illustrate that the increase in liquidity that emerged from the launch of the Euro made house prices increase through an asset price in ‡ation. Lower interest rates following the increase in liquidity and collateral e¤ects stemming from higher house prices contributed to the credit boom in the Euro area, being the e¤ects more remarkable in the periphery, given that these countries were more leveraged.
Furthermore, we also analyze how asymmetric shocks helped determine the imbalances in housing and credit markets in the Euro area. First, we consider a house price shock in the periphery. We see that a stronger housing demand preference in these economies has as a consequence a strong increase in credit, through the collateral constraint of borrowers. Second, we study the e¤ects of an asymmetric technology shock in the core economies. We observe that higher productivity in the core makes the common interest rate decrease; this supply shock in the core is transmitted to the periphery as a demand shock through lower interest rates, making credit and house prices increase.
In conclusion, a combination of an increase in liquidity in the Euro area coming from the common monetary policy, together with asymmetric house price and technology shocks, contributed to the increase in house prices in the Euro area and the stronger credit growth in the peripheral economies.
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